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Note
Gagging on the First Amendment: Assessing
Challenges to the Reauthorization Act’s
Nondisclosure Provision
Kyle Hawkins∗
“Safety from external danger is the most powerful director
of national conduct.”
Alexander Hamilton1

In 2004, the president of a small Internet access and consulting business received a national security letter (NSL) from
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).2 The letter ordered
the president to divulge private information about one of the
company’s clients.3 A judge had not reviewed or approved the
letter.4 Accompanying the letter was a gag order: the president
was forbidden to disclose to anyone, including the client, that
the FBI was seeking the requested information.5 The president’s story is known only because of his anonymous editorial
in The Washington Post.6 To this day, the identity of the presi∗ J.D. Candidate 2009, University of Minnesota Law School; A.B. 2002,
Harvard College. Special thanks to Professors Michael Stokes Paulsen and
Heidi Kitrosser for invaluable advice and commentary. Thanks also to Elizabeth Borer, David Jensen, Jeff Justman, and Michael Schoepf for their helpful
feedback on earlier drafts. Finally, thanks to Doug and Greer Hawkins and
June Bands for constant support and encouragement. Copyright © 2008 by
Kyle Hawkins.
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 8, at 35 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
2. Editorial, My National Security Letter Gag Order, WASH. POST, Mar.
23, 2007, at A17.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. On March 23, 2007, the company president submitted an editorial
to The Washington Post describing his or her experiences. The newspaper’s
editorial board noted in a disclaimer that while it does not publish anonymous
pieces as a matter of policy, it made an exception in this case “because the author—who would have preferred to be named—is legally prohibited from dis-
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dent, including his (or her) gender and company, is not publicly
known.
Rather than submitting the requested information to the
FBI, the president enlisted the assistance of the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) and filed a lawsuit—Doe v. Ashcroft,
known now as Doe I—challenging the constitutionality of the
NSL power.7 This lawsuit presented the district court with a
difficult question of balancing. The case pitted an individual’s
First Amendment rights against the government’s need for
secrecy in its terrorism investigations.8 To the district court,
this was a simple case of prior restraint, legally indistinguishable from a local government film board prohibiting a movie’s
general release prior to its screening for indecency.9 Prior restraints on speech require strict scrutiny review, the court reasoned.10 The fact that the subject matter involved national security during the post-9/11 war on terror did not persuade the
court to grant the FBI additional leeway.11 Appling a strict
scrutiny standard of review, the court found the relevant NSL
nondisclosure provisions unconstitutional.12 The president’s
First Amendment challenge succeeded over the government’s
objection that the statute imposed no prior restraint and merited only intermediate scrutiny.13
The story did not end there. Doe I was only the first skirmish in a protracted back-and-forth between Congress, Internet providers and the federal courts; Doe v. Gonzales (Doe III)

closing his or her identity.” Id.
7. See Doe v. Ashcroft (Doe I), 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006).
8. See id. at 474 (“The high stakes here . . . compel the Court to strike
the most sensitive judicial balance, calibrating by delicate increments toward
a result that adequately protects national security without unduly sacrificing
individual freedoms, that endeavors to do what is just for one and right for
all.”).
9. See Doe v. Gonzales (Doe III), 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 399–400 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (comparing the NSL nondisclosure order to the facts of Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), which involved film restrictions imposed by the
Maryland State Board of Censors).
10. See id. at 401 (concluding that strict scrutiny should apply even
though the case involves national security).
11. See id.
12. See id. at 425.
13. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of the Government's Cross-Motion to Dismiss
the Complaint Or For Summary Judgment, at 50–54, Doe I, 334 F. Supp. 2d
471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. 04 Civ. 2614), vacated, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006).
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is merely the latest episode.14 That tug-of-war continues today
as Congress is considering amendments to the NSL nondisclosure provision in response to Doe III.15 Through the maze of repealed provisions and court decisions, however, there remains
the fundamental question of whether the Doe III court was correct to apply strict scrutiny. This question remains alive today
as the latest iteration of the NSL nondisclosure provision, introduced in the Senate in September 2007, does not prescribe a
specific standard to courts reviewing a nondisclosure challenge.16 The question is open-ended, and, on future challenges,
judges in other jurisdictions must decide whether to follow the
Doe III rule or to adopt a different test.
This Note offers a critique of the Doe decisions, which all
apply strict scrutiny, and suggests that intermediate scrutiny
is the proper standard of review for NSL nondisclosure challenges. Based on a line of cases that grew from the Espionage
Act of 1917,17 federal courts have previously indicated that
matters of national security deserve different legal treatment
than run-of-the-mill free speech cases.18 This Note suggests
that such reasoning should apply to NSL nondisclosure challenges, and reviewing courts should use a lower standard. In
that regard, this Note presents a new approach to an outcome
that the government unsuccessfully sought in Doe I.19 The government’s brief argued for intermediate scrutiny based on a
line of grand jury secrecy cases.20 Since that reasoning failed in
the Doe cases and the courts applied strict scrutiny, the government needs a new argument to justify intermediate scruti14. See Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 387–89 (discussing the procedural history of the case including Doe I, Doe v. Gonzales (Doe II), 386 F. Supp. 2d 66
(D. Conn. 2005), and congressional responses).
15. See NSL Reform Act of 2007, S. 2088, 110th Cong. (2007).
16. Id.
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 793 (2000).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1070 (4th Cir. 1988)
(holding that First Amendment rights are not implicated in Espionage Act
cases); United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 637 (E.D. Va. 2006) (denying First Amendment protection for a government employee who leaked classified information).
19. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of the Government's Cross-Motion to Dismiss
the Complaint Or For Summary Judgment, at 50–54, Doe I, 334 F. Supp. 2d
471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. 04 Civ. 2614), vacated, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006)
(arguing in support of intermediate scrutiny based on the Butterworth v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 624 (1990) line of cases but not invoking Espionage Act jurisprudence).
20. See infra notes 122–45, 147–56.
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ny. This Note devises that that new argument should be based
on national-security jurisprudence. In order to understand the
role NSLs play in promoting national security, Part I discusses
the origins of NSLs, as well as their current statutory construction and ongoing uses. Part II then discusses relevant First
Amendment and national security doctrine as it affects nondisclosure orders. Finally, Part III analyzes the government’s interest in secrecy and explains why courts should apply intermediate scrutiny for challenges to NSL statutes.
I. THE HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE
NSL PROCEDURE AS AN ANTITERRORISM TACTIC
Under the current statutory scheme, NSLs “require Americans to cough up loads of information on colleagues and
clients—maybe you—and to never breathe a word to anyone of
what they’ve done.”21 Although this Note focuses primarily on
the statute at issue in Doe III,22 four statutes authorize the FBI
to issue NSLs.23 The earliest of these dates to 1986.24 However,
the events of September 11, 2001 and the enactment of the
USA Patriot Act in late 200125 brought national attention26 to
NSLs due to the important role that they play in gathering ter21. Ronald J. Sievert, Patriot 2005-2007: Truth, Controversy, and Consequences, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 319, 330 (2007) (quoting On Point: National
Security Letters: Use or Misuse? (National Public Radio broadcast Nov. 10,
2005), available at http://archives.onpointradio.org/shows/2005/11/20051110_
a_main.asp).
22. See USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (codified in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3511 (West
2006)), invalidated by Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y 2007).
23. See, e.g., Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA), 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3401–
3422 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008); Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681 (2000); Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2709 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008), invalidated by Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 436 (West 2003 & Supp.
2008).
24. See 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3401–22.
25. See USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.). For a general discussion of the evolution
of the Patriot Act, see DONALD J. MUSCH, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 203–06 (2003).
26. See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Broad Domestic Role Asked
for C.I.A. and the Pentagon, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2003, at A21 (noting the Bush
administration’s efforts to grant the NSL power to the C.I.A. and the Pentagon); see also Barton Gellman, The FBI's Secret Scrutiny: In Hunt for Terrorists, Bureau Examines Records of Ordinary Americans, WASH. POST, Nov. 6,
2005, at A1 (reporting that the government issues over 30,000 NSLs each
year).
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rorism-related intelligence.27 A recent report from the Office of
the Inspector General (OIG Report) indicates that the NSLs
enable FBI agents to generate “link analyses,” one of the “principal analytical intelligence products” generated by FBI Field
Intelligence Groups.28 According to that same report, the government may use information derived from NSLs to develop a
variety of written products that are shared with Joint Terrorism Task Forces.29 This Section outlines those important functions and illustrates the critical value of NSLs as an antiterrorism tool.
A. THE STATUTORY UNDERPINNINGS OF NSLS
As one scholar has observed: “[s]ecrecy has been part of national security operations for as long as there has been a nation
to secure [and] it has been problematic ever since.”30 The current NSL regime is emblematic of the problems of secrecy as it
has evolved into a tug-of-war in which Congress attempts to
balance the government’s secrecy interests with the rights of
citizens.31 Congress passed the first NSL statute32 as a modification to the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) of 1978.33
The original RFPA sought to prevent unjustified monitoring of
a financial institution’s customers while still allowing law enforcement to conduct investigative work.34 In 1986, Congress
enacted the first NSL provision, which allowed the FBI to demand financial records in foreign-intelligence cases without no-

27. See, e.g., Press Release, Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Senate Judiciary
Comm., Reaction of Sen. Patrick Leahy, On the Inspector General’s Report on
the Use of National Security Letters (Mar. 9, 2007), available at http://leahy
.senate.gov/press/200703/030907.html (describing NSLs as “a powerful tool”).
28. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A
REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS, xxv (2007) [hereinafter OIG REPORT]. Perhaps because of the
secrecy surrounding NSLs, the OIG REPORT is the only comprehensive source
on current NSL usage.
29. Id.
30. Nathan Alexander Sales, Secrecy and National Security Investigations, 58 ALA. L. REV. 811, 811 (2007).
31. For a discussion of the evolution of NSL statutes, see id. at 849–54
(discussing the legislative histories of the RFPA, FCRA, and ECPA NSL statutes). Sales notes that the various NSL secrecy requirements “are substantively indistinguishable.” Id. at 852.
32. See Pub. L. No. 99-569, 100 Stat. 3197 (1986) (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C.A. § 3414 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008)).
33. See id.
34. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, at 33 (1978).
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tifying the subject in advance.35 Fifteen years later, the Patriot
Act lowered that standard, and now financial institutions must
comply with an NSL request if the FBI certifies in writing that
the records it seeks support counterintelligence to fight international terrorism.36
In 1986, Congress enacted the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act’s (ECPA) NSL provision—which lies at the heart of
the Doe case.37 As originally enacted, the ECPA required the
government to show that investigations were relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation in order to obtain a court order before instigating pen registers or trap-and-trace devices.38 The
Patriot Act, however, amended the ECPA, allowing the FBI to
obtain an individual’s name, address, length of service, and local and long distance toll-billing records upon certification that
they relate to international antiterrorism investigations.39 The
Patriot Act also eliminated the requirement that the subject be
a foreign-power’s agent.40 The ECPA comes with a nondisclosure provision barring any recipient from disclosing that he has
received an NSL.41 This nondisclosure order lies at the heart of
the Doe disputes.42
The two remaining NSL statutes are not discussed in the
Doe cases. One came as an amendment to the National Security
Act of 1947.43 Prompted by Aldrich Ames’s espionage investigation,44 the National Security Act NSL statute authorized the
FBI to request financial records or other consumer reports of
government employees targeted in investigations.45 According
35. See Pub. L. No. 99-569, 100 Stat. 3197 (1986) (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C.A. § 3414 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008)); see also OIG REPORT, supra
note 28, at 11–12.
36. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3414(a)(5)(A).
37. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2709 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008), invalidated by Doe
III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
38. See OIG REPORT, supra note 28, at 12–13 (discussing the application
of pre-Patriot Act ECPA provisions).
39. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2709(b)(2).
40. See Sievert, supra note 21, at 338 (discussing the Patriot Act’s changes
to the ECPA).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c)(1) (2000).
42. See, e.g., Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 379, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting
the plaintiffs’ challenge to the constitutionality of § 2709).
43. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 436 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008).
44. See OIG REPORT, supra note 28, at 15 (“In 1994, in the wake of the espionage investigation of former Central Intelligence Agency employee Aldrich
Ames, Congress enacted an additional NSL authority by amending the National Security Act of 1947.”).
45. See 50 U.S.C. § 436(a)(1)–(2)(A) (2000).
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to available government information, these NSLs are used very
rarely.46
The final NSL authority comes from the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) of 1970.47 Since the Patriot Act, the FBI
can issue two types of NSLs under the FCRA to obtain credit
reports on individuals pursuant to national-security investigations.48
B. THE CURRENT ROLE OF NSLS IN FBI INVESTIGATIONS
NSLs might best be understood as the intelligence analogue to administrative subpoenas in the criminal context.49 According to the OIG Report, prepared independently of the FBI,
NSLs support a variety of key counterterrorism functions.50
Primary among these is acquiring information to bolster FISA
applications for other intelligence-gathering tools, such as electronic surveillance, pen registers, trap-and-trace devices, and
physical searches.51 NSLs often provide the baseline evidence
that justifies more intrusive investigations.52 NSLs also are key
to linking various suspects’ communications or finances, as well
as obtaining grounds to open new investigations or expand existing ones.53 In this way, NSLs appear to be a type of gateway
tool preceding more elaborate procedures.54 The FBI also
stresses that NSLs are beneficial in corroborating information
produced in other investigations.55 The information obtained
under NSLs may be distributed to U.S. Attorney’s Offices to aid
prosecutions.56 Indeed, the OIG Report demonstrates that
46. See OIG REPORT, supra note 28, at xiv.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
48. Id.
49. Sievert, supra note 21, at 338 (“In the criminal context [computer and
telephone] information has long been obtained by administrative subpoenas,
while in the intelligence context the FBI has utilized [NSLs].”); see also Sales,
supra note 30, at 849 (referring to NSLs as “subpoenalike authorities”).
50. See OIG REPORT, supra note 28, at xlvi.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. (“[NSLs] provid[e] evidence to initiate new investigations [and] expand national security investigations.”).
54. See id.
55. Id. For more discussion on the general use of NSLs, see generally Michael J. Woods, Counterintelligence and Access to Transactional Records: A
Practical History of USA PATRIOT Act Section 215, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. &
POL’Y 37, 43–50 (2005). Woods is the former chief of the FBI’s National Security Law Unit. Id. at 37.
56. See OIG REPORT, supra note 28, at xlvi.
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NSLs are noted more for their versatility than for any one particular function.57
In practice, the use of NSLs is not “quite so sinister” as it
may sound, according to one expert.58 NSL use is “fairly limited
and targeted” at information that the individual has already
disclosed to third parties anyway.59 Professor Daniel J. Solove
has offered one illustration of how an NSL might be issued.60
First, the FBI comes across an anonymous website proclaiming
support for a terrorist organization and urging others to join
the group.61 The FBI then obtains the IP address for that site
and issues an NSL to the Internet service provider to learn the
author’s identity.62 The nondisclosure requirement placed on
the provider exists only to prevent a target from changing his
behavior should he learn that he is being watched.63
The OIG Report provides a second, real-life example of
NSLs in action.64 The FBI, based on intelligence indicating that
a detainee had used an e-mail account, issued NSLs to obtain
usage information, such as URL history, on that account.65
That information in turn led to further NSLs to obtain phone
records for both the detainee and his associates.66 One of those
sources linked the detainee to a different suspect, and as a result, that latter individual was later convicted for materially
supporting terrorism.67
From 2003 through 2005, the FBI issued 143,074 NSL requests.68 In 2004, the number of requests issued jumped to
56,507, up from 39,346 in 2003.69 However, 2005 (the most recent year for which data are available) saw a decline in NSL
57. See id.
58. See Sievert, supra note 21, at 339. But see Caroline Fredrickson,
American Civil Liberties Union, Statement for the Record, http://www.aclu
.org/safefree/nationalsecurityletters/29200leg20070328.html (arguing that the
OIG Report “confirms our worst fears” that the NSL authority is more intrusive and unjustified than Sievert suggests).
59. Sievert, supra note 21, at 339.
60. See Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 167 (2007).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Sales, supra note 30, at 852.
64. OIG REPORT, supra note 28, at 64.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 36.
69. Id. at 37 fig. 4.1.
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use, down to 47,221.70 These requests currently target U.S.
persons at a higher rate than non-U.S. persons.71 That percentage grew from about 39 percent of 2003 NSL requests to about
53 percent of 2005 NSL requests.72 In other words, NSL use became more prevalent from 2003 to 2005 and increasingly targeted U.S. citizens and permanent residents.
On the whole, the vast majority of NSL requests—over seventy-three percent—arise through counterterrorism investigations.73 The remaining fraction was issued in counterintelligence operations and in foreign-computer-intrusion cyber
investigations.74 In counterterrorism investigations, NSL use
almost doubled from 2003 to 2005.75 About 19 percent of all the
counterterrorism investigations during this period involved
NSLs.76 However, there are no statistics available on how often
NSLs produce information actually used in a criminal proceeding.77
The FBI does not report specific success statistics for
NSLs, and so the public does not know the extent to which they
aid counterterrorist efforts. Nevertheless, the FBI asserts that
NSLs are “indispensable investigative tools that serve as building blocks in many counterterrorism and counterintelligence
investigations.”78 The above statistics and examples at least
confirm their frequent use. As the detainee example illustrates,
70. See id. at 37–38.
71. Id. The term “United States person” means:
[A] United States citizen, an alien known by the intelligence agency
concerned to be a permanent resident alien, an unincorporated association substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent
resident aliens, or a corporation incorporated in the United States,
except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.
Exec. Order No. 12,333 § 3.4(i), 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted as amended in
50 U.S.C. § 401 (2000 & Supp. 2006); see also Exec. Order No. 13,355, 3 C.F.R.
218 (2005), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (2000 & Supp. 2006),
amending Exec. Order No. 12,333, supra.
72. See OIG REPORT, supra note 28, at 38.
73. Id. at 39.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See id. at xlvi (“[B]ecause information derived from national security
letters is not marked or tagged as such, it is impossible to determine when and
how often the FBI provided information derived from national security letters
to law enforcement authorities for use in criminal proceedings.”).
78. Id. at xlvi; see also id. at 65 (listing numerous uses for NSLs); id. at
64–65 (discussing real-life examples of how NSLs aided specific investigations).
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NSLs play a role in what the Supreme Court has acknowledged
as the key intelligence task of adding “bits and pieces of data”
to paint a broader, more useful picture.79
C. ABUSES OF THE NSL POWER
In addition to legitimate and lawful uses, the OIG reports
that the FBI on numerous occasions misused NSLs.80 The OIG
report lists eight general categories of improper NSL use.81
These included issuing NSLs after the proper investigative authority had lapsed and investigating beyond the prescribed
time limits in the NSL.82 Most of the violations were selfidentified and properly reported to the relevant administrative
body, although the OIG documented several instances when the
government didn’t report violations.83
The OIG Report also cautions the reader not to make too
much of the abuses, because, in most cases, the FBI obtained
information it had a right to receive, even if it had followed
proper protocol.84 Also, no misuse of the NSL power constituted
criminal conduct.85 As one observer noted, “there was no improper use of the letters against individuals who were not legitimate suspects.”86 Indeed, the FBI rarely obtained information
it had no right to receive.87
79. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985). One author has dubbed this
piece-by-piece intelligence gathering as “mosaic theory,” and argues that it has
been widely invoked by the Bush II administration to “justify numerous actions.” See Christina E. Wells, CIA v. Sims: Mosaic Theory and Government
Attitude, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 845, 863 (2006).
80. See OIG REPORT, supra note 28, at 66–107 (documenting instances of
illegal or improper use of the NSL authority). The OIG Report is the only current source that comprehensively documents NSL misuses.
81. Id. at 66–67.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 67 (noting misuses of NSLs that were properly reported to the
FBI’s Office of General Counsel as well as incidents that should have been reported but were not and were instead identified by the Office of General Counsel during site visits).
84. Id. (“[I]n most cases the FBI was seeking to obtain information that it
could have obtained properly if it had followed its applicable statutes, guidelines, and internal policies.”). But see Fredrickson, supra note 58 (“[T]he FBI
uses its NSL authorities to systematically collect private information about
people who are not reasonably suspected of being involved in terrorism, and it
retains this information indefinitely.”).
85. OIG REPORT, supra note 28, at 67 (“We also did not find any indication that the FBI’s misuse of NSL authorities constituted criminal misconduct.”).
86. Sievert, supra note 21, at 339. Compare id. (arguing that the government had used NSLs against legitimate suspects), with Fredrickson, supra
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D. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE NSL AUTHORITY
Of the four NSL statutes discussed above, the ECPA has
generated the greatest legal controversy in recent times.88 In
Doe I, the district court found that the statute facially unconstitutional under the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.89
Shortly thereafter, in a case involving a different plaintiff, a
second district court struck down ECPA’s nondisclosure requirement as unconstitutional in Doe v. Gonzales (Doe II).90 It
found that the statute failed strict scrutiny because it was not
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.91
Before Doe I and Doe II were appealed, however, Congress
passed the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization
Act of 2005 (Reauthorization Act).92 This new legislation substantially altered § 2709 and expanded judicial review of
NSLs.93 Because of these statutory changes, the Second Circuit
remanded Doe I to the district court for consideration in light of
the new procedures.94
The case thus became Doe III, in which despite the statutory revisions, the anonymous company president won another
victory. The district court rejected the nondisclosure portion of
§ 2709(a) and parts of § 3511 as unconstitutional on First
Amendment grounds only.95 After concluding that the plaintiffs
did have appropriate standing to challenge the statutes at issue,96 the court found that § 2709’s nondisclosure provision
constituted a prior restraint as well as a content-based restricnote 58 (“The Inspector General reviewed just a tiny proportion of NSLs issued by the FBI from 2003 through 2005, yet he found an extraordinary level
of mismanagement, incompetence, and willful misconduct . . . .”).
87. See Sievert, supra note, 21, at 339.
88. See, e.g., Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Doe II, 386
F. Supp. 2d 66, 68–69 (D. Conn. 2005); Doe I, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 474
(S.D.N.Y 2004), vacated, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Sievert, supra
note 21, at 339 (noting that with Doe I, “for the first time in the long history of
the utilization of NSLs, the government was repeatedly challenged by NSL
recipients in court”); Andrew E. Nieland, Note, National Security Letters and
the Amended Patriot Act, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1201, 1202 (2007) (noting that
until recently, NSL recipients “apparently never challenged their validity”).
89. Doe I, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 475.
90. See Doe II, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 82.
91. Id.
92. Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (codified in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3511
(West 2006), invalidated by Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 379.
93. Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 386.
94. See Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415, 419 (2d Cir. 2006).
95. See Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 386–87.
96. Id. at 396.
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tion on speech.97 The court, therefore, applied strict scrutiny98
and would uphold the statute “only if it is narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling government interest, and there are no
less restrictive alternatives [that] would be at least as effective
in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was
enacted to serve.”99 The court then considered whether the
Reauthorization Act provides requisite safeguards to survive a
constitutional challenge.100 First, the court found that the statute presents a licensing scheme,101 and went on to conclude
that its validity is subject to all three prongs of the so-called
Freedman v. Maryland test.102 Section 3511(b) could not satisfy
the third Freedman prong, the court reasoned, because the government does not bear the burden of justifying the NSL request.103 For this reason, the Reauthorization Act failed to survive the First Amendment challenge.104
Next, the court held that § 3511(b) violated the longstanding principles of the separation of powers.105 The problem
97. Id. at 397.
98. Id. at 398 (noting that prior restraints and content-based speech restrictions traditionally require strict scrutiny); see, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (“If a statute regulates
speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest.”); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70
(1963) (“Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.”).
99. Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d. at 398 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
100. Id. at 399–401 (discussing the requirements to satisfy Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) safeguards).
101. Id. at 400 (“As a preliminary matter, this Court finds that § 2709(c)
does constitute a form of licensing.”).
102. Id. at 399–406 (noting that all three Freedman procedural safeguards
apply); see also Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58–60 (1965). The Freedman case involved a film-censorship board that prohibited the screenings of
films before the board approved them. Id. at 52. In this way, the film board
imposed a prior restraint on film screenings, raising First Amendment issues.
Id. The three Freedman prongs are, first, that the censor bear “the burden of
proving that the film is unprotected expression.” Id. at 58. Second, mandatory
advance submission of all films is permissible, but “the requirement cannot be
administered in a manner which would lend an effect of finality to the censor’s
determination whether a film constitutes protected expression.” Id. Third, the
censor must, “within a specified brief period, either issue a license or go to
court to restrain showing the film.” Id. at 59.
103. Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 405–06.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 411; see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437
(2000) (noting that congressional acts may not supersede the Supreme Court’s
decisions interpreting the Constitution).

286

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[93:274

lies in § 3511(b)’s requirement that the courts “blindly credit”
the FBI’s determination that disclosure may result in harm.106
In other words, the statute afforded the executive branch too
much control over the nature of the oversight any particular
request will receive, even going so far as to dictate a judicial
standard of review. The lack of real judicial oversight, as well
as the potentially unlimited duration of a nondisclosure order,
indicated that § 2709(c) was not narrowly tailored,107 providing
further grounds for its defeat. As a final matter, the court
found the unconstitutional portions of the statute to be nonseverable from the broader NSL power, and therefore struck
down § 2709 in its entirety.108
Congress responded quickly to Doe III.109 The proposed
NSL Reform Act of 2007 allows the FBI Director (or other approved officials) to impose a thirty-day nondisclosure period
subject to certain criteria.110 The proposal also orders the FBI
to relinquish the nondisclosure requirement if the need for
nondisclosure ceases prior to the thirty-day period.111 If the FBI
wishes to extend the thirty-day period, it would apply to the
district court for an extension.112 Even if the court grants an
extension, the FBI must terminate the nondisclosure order if,
at any point, the facts supporting the order cease to exist.113
The statute stops short of prescribing a strict scrutiny
standard for a reviewing court. Proposed § 2709(c)(6) allows a
court to issue an ex parte order for the NSL request if “there is
reason to believe” that disclosure will bring about one of several
enumerated harms and that “the nondisclosure requirement is
narrowly tailored to address the specific harm identified by the
Government.”114 In other words, the proposed § 2709 requires
narrow tailoring but not a “compelling government interest” as
106. Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 418.
107. Id. at 420–22 (concluding that the scope of the nondisclosure order
could be narrower and noting that “it is hard to conceive of any circumstances
that would justify a permanent bar on disclosure”).
108. See id. at 424–25.
109. See NSL Reform Act of 2007, S. 2088, 110th Cong. (2007). As of publication this bill has not yet passed. This Note does not evaluate this specific
bill, but instead asks how a court should properly review challenges to the
NSL regime.
110. See id. § 2.
111. See id. § 9.
112. See id.
113. See id. § 2.
114. See id.
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per typical strict scrutiny.115 Congress apparently leaves it to
courts to determine the appropriate standard of review, raising
a question about what courts should choose.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY
The heart of the Doe III decision—and the fundamental
question future challenges must face—is whether the Constitution requires NSL statutes to pass strict scrutiny.116 One set of
cases—including Seattle Times Company v. Rhinehart,117 Butterworth v. Smith,118 and others cited by the Doe III court—
indicates that strict scrutiny is appropriate.119 However, because NSLs advance national-security interests, the Doe III
court should have considered a different line of cases beginning
with New York Times Company v. United States120 (“Pentagon
Papers”), the “most famous case involving the publication of national security secrets.”121 This Section, then, analyzes those
parallel sets of case law and the values that they each embody.
A. RHINEHART, BUTTERWORTH, AND STRICT SCRUTINY
The Rhinehart decision addressed the right to disclose, before trial, information gained in pretrial discovery.122 In considering the legality of the protective order that would prevent
dissemination, the Supreme Court noted that First Amendment
rights are not absolute, and that the First Amendment does not
categorically allow individuals the right to disseminate pretrial
discovery at any time.123 The antidissemination statute would
survive only if it were narrowly tailored to advance an “important or substantial” government interest.124 The Court empha115. See Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that
passing strict scrutiny requires a statute to be “narrowly tailored to promote a
compelling government interest” (citing United States v. Playboy Entm’t
Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000))).
116. See Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 396–99.
117. See 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
118. See 494 U.S. 624 (1990).
119. See Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 403–05.
120. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
121. See Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech,
2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 881, 897.
122. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 22.
123. Id. at 31.
124. Id. at 32 (“[I]t is necessary to consider whether the practice in question [furthers] an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to
the suppression of expression and whether the limitation of First Amendment
freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the
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sized the public nature of the information in question125 and
noted that because pretrial discovery is not public, “restraints
placed on discovered, but not yet admitted, information are not
a restriction on a traditionally public source of information.”126
Rhinehart, therefore, represents the idea that some nondisclosure statutes deserve less First Amendment scrutiny “than
would restraints on dissemination of information in a different
context.”127 The government may limit the dissemination of certain types of acquired information—in this case, information
obtained through the non-public discovery process.128
A similar issue appeared six years later in Butterworth,
which addressed a Florida law prohibiting a grand jury witness
from ever disclosing testimony he gave before a grand jury.129
The Court’s review used the strict scrutiny language, calling for
“a state interest of the highest order.”130 Notably, however,
whatever secrecy interest the government held dies when the
grand jury investigation concludes.131 Therefore, the government’s interest in grand jury secrecy does not allow permanent
nondisclosure,132 and for that reason, the Florida statute failed
to pass constitutional muster.133 Like Rhinehart, Butterworth
suggests that nondisclosure statutes are acceptable so long as
they are limited in duration.
In his Butterworth concurrence, Justice Scalia noted that
“there is considerable doubt whether a witness can be prohibited, even while the grand jury is sitting, from making public
what he knew before he entered the grand jury room.”134 However, whether that witness can disclose the grand jury proceedings—knowledge gained “only by virtue of being made a witness”—is a different matter.135 Justice Scalia suggests that the

particular governmental interest involved.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
125. See id. at 33.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 34.
128. Id.
129. Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 626 (1990).
130. Id. at 632 (citing Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) and Smith v.
Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 635–36.
134. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., concurring).
135. See id.
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state may have a sufficient interest in prohibiting a witness
from disclosing that acquired knowledge.136
Kamasinki v. Judicial Review Council also considered
similar statutory confidentiality provisions.137 At issue was a
Connecticut statute that governed the Judicial Review Council
(JRC), the body that investigates complaints against judges.138
Using strict scrutiny,139 the Second Circuit held that the statute’s nondisclosure provision did not violate the First Amendment.140 The First Amendment allows a state, with sufficient
interest in doing so, to “prohibit a complainant’s disclosure of
the fact that he has filed a complaint, or a witness’s disclosure
of the fact that he has testified . . . .”141 The court also found
that it would be constitutional to prohibit disclosure of information acquired through JRC interaction.142
The Doe III court mentioned additional cases—including
United States v. Aguilar,143 Hoffmann-Pugh v. Keenan,144 and
Freedman v. Maryland145—that illustrate the proper application of strict scrutiny.146 In particular, Freedman involved the
constitutionality of a Maryland statute that required movie
theaters to submit films to a state censorship board prior to
public screenings.147 Finding the censorship system a prior restraint on speech, the Court noted that prior restraints bear a
heavy presumption against their constitutionality.148 To mitigate the dangers of censorship, the Court established three procedural safeguards.149 First, the censor must show that the film
falls outside protected expression.150 Second, mandatory advance submission of all films is permissible, but the process
136. See id.
137. 44 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 1994).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 109 (“We agree that the restrictions here are content-based, and
that strict scrutiny is the correct standard.”).
140. Id. at 108.
141. Id. at 111.
142. Id.
143. 515 U.S. 593 (1995).
144. 338 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2003).
145. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
146. See Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussing
Aguilar); id. at 395 (referencing Hoffmann-Pugh); id. at 399–407 (discussing
and applying Freedman).
147. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 52.
148. Id. at 57.
149. Id. at 58–59.
150. Id.

290

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[93:274

may not “lend an effect of finality” to the censor’s judgment.151
In other words, any valid final restraint requires a judicial determination.152 Third, the censor must, “within a specified brief
period,” license the film or file for restraint in court.153 The goal
in such a requirement is to mitigate the dangers of an inappropriate license denial, and there is a clear emphasis on the government’s responsibility of bearing the burden.154
A licensing scheme does not automatically fall within
Freedman’s territory.155 For example, the Supreme Court noted
in Thomas v. Chicago Park District that Freedman does not apply to “[a] content-neutral time, place, and manner” regulation
of the use of a public forum.156 However, the Doe III court held
that the NSL nondisclosure orders are content-based, and that
there are no grounds for believing that Freedman’s safeguards
would not apply.157
B. THE PENTAGON PAPERS, THE ESPIONAGE ACT, AND JUDICIAL
DEFERENCE
NSLs, as the name suggests, invoke issues of national security, and it is appropriate to examine whether a special standard should apply. Both the Pentagon Papers case158 and subsequent prosecutions under the Espionage Act of 1917159
suggest that the executive branch deserves more leeway in
matters of national security than strict scrutiny allows.160
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 58–59.
154. Id. at 59.
155. See Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 400–01 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Since
Freedman, the Supreme Court has addressed a broad range of licensing systems, and it has decided, on a case-by-case basis, whether Freedman’s procedural protections are required to validate the licensing at issue.”).
156. See Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322 (2002) (“We have
never required that a content-neutral permit scheme regulating speech in a
public forum adhere to the procedural requirements set forth in Freedman.”).
For a general discussion of content-based versus content-neutral restrictions
on speech, see Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws,
Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted
Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1286–93 (2005).
157. See Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 400–01 (“There is no basis justifying a
conclusion that Freedman is limited to cases involving obscenity or sexuallyoriented expression, as the Government suggests, or that it is somehow not
applicable to cases that involve national security.”).
158. 403 U.S. 713, 713 (1971).
159. 18 U.S.C. § 793 (2000).
160. See, e.g., id.; N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 741 (Marshall, J., concur-
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The Pentagon Papers was not prosecuted under the Espionage Act; rather, the government was seeking a preliminary injunction against The New York Times.161 The government’s
purpose was to prevent The New York Times from revealing the
decision-making process that led to the Vietnam War.162 The
Supreme Court denied the injunction solely on First Amendment grounds.163
In the concurrences and dissents, however, lies the notion
that even though an injunction was improper in this particular
case, there may nevertheless be circumstances in which “the
First Amendment [would] permit an injunction against publishing information about government plans or operations.”164
Justice White even admitted that publishing the information at
stake in Pentagon Papers “will do substantial damage to public
interests”165 and hinted that although an injunction was inappropriate here, that “does not mean that [the government]
could not successfully proceed in another way.”166 The difficult
task becomes guessing what alternative direction might have
been successful.
Dissenting Justice Harlan took a stronger view.167 He
called upon the judiciary to review the President’s initial determination and to ensure that the President had not exceeded
the scope of his foreign-policy power.168 This view concedes significant power to the Executive. The role of the Court is merely
to review the Executive’s determination and to guarantee that
an individual of appropriate authority makes the necessary determination.169 These two inquiries, according to Justice Harlan, formed the judiciary’s limit because executive decisions on
foreign policy are inherently political rather than judicial.170
These “are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neiring); see also United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1057 (4th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 602 (E.D. Va. 2000).
161. See Kitrosser, supra note 121, at 897. However, some Supreme Court
Justices did invoke the Espionage Act in their concurrences. See N.Y. Times
Co., 403 U.S. at 720–21 (Douglas, J., concurring).
162. See N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714, 717.
163. See id.; Kitrosser, supra note 121, at 897.
164. N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 731 (White, J., concurring).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 733.
167. See id. at 757 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 756–57.
170. Id.
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ther aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long
been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject
to judicial intrusion or inquiry.”171 Most importantly, Justice
Harlan argued that, “the scope of review must be exceedingly
narrow” with appropriate deference to the judgment of a coequal branch “operating within the field of its constitutional
prerogative.”172 He argued that executive branch officers must
be given an opportunity to explain the relevance of the national
security issue, and the ensuing judicial review “should be in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion.”173 This reasoning seems to suggest that in cases in which the Executive
has acted to advance his constitutional responsibilities of ensuring national security, the judiciary is not equipped to judge
the effectiveness of the actions, and the Executive must be given a significant amount of leeway.
Justice Blackmun also dissented and emphasized the powers of Article II.174 Noting that Article II vests the foreign affairs power in the Executive and charges that branch with
maintaining national security, he argued against First
Amendment absolutism at the expense of “downgrading other
provisions.”175 He asserted that “there are situations where restraint is in order and is constitutional,” and times of war may
allow different restrictions than times of peace.176 He did not
provide specific examples, but he at least left open the possibility that legitimate Article II interests may trump the First
Amendment.
Even Justice Stewart’s concurrence suggested great deference to Executive decisions.177 He found it obvious that maintaining national security requires confidentiality and secrecy.178 He argued that the Constitution’s grant of “unshared
power” to the Executive bestows a constitutional “duty” to “protect the confidentiality necessary to carry out its responsibilities in the fields of international relations and national de-

171. Id. at 757–58 (citing Chi. & Se. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333
U.S. 103, 111 (1948)).
172. Id. at 758.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 759–63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 761.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 727–28 (Stewart, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 728 (“In the area of basic national defense the frequent need for
absolute secrecy is, of course, self-evident.”).
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fense.”179 Stewart, then, at least argued for a highly deferential
approach to the Executive on matters of national security, even
advocating suppression of some of the documents at issue in
Pentagon Papers.180
Of course, these dissents did not carry the day and the majority held that the preliminary injunction was unwarranted
and rejected special treatment for issues of national security.181
That does not mean, however, that a court today should disregard the dissenting views. First, Pentagon Papers came shortly
after the end of the Warren Court, a time when the U.S. Supreme Court rapidly expanded civil rights and prioritized individual liberties above other interests.182 The rights-focused values of that era might not sway today’s more conservative
Supreme Court. Second, the Pentagon Papers majority acknowledged that future courts need not duplicate its reasoning.
Justice Brennan, for example, suggests that a similar future
case could justifiably reach a different outcome.183
These various Pentagon Papers opinions suggest that at
least a large minority of the Court would grant the Executive a
highly deferential review standard when deciding issues of national security. These opinions do not explicitly advocate intermediate scrutiny—as opposed to strict scrutiny—or some
other named standard. Yet Justices Harlan, Blackmun, and
Stewart’s views certainly suggest that the high burden of strict
scrutiny may not always be appropriate.

179. Id. at 729–30.
180. Id. at 730. Justice Stewart filed a concurrence rather than a dissent
because “no statutes or regulations authorized the punishment sought and because the very high threshold for imposing a prior restraint without such authorization was not clearly met. Notably, he lamented that the Court had been
asked “to perform a function that the Constitution gave to the Executive, not
the Judiciary.” Kitrosser, supra note 121, at 898–99 (quoting N.Y. Times Co.,
403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
181. N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714.
182. See Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Judicial Restraint of the Warren Court
(and Why it Matters), 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 255, 257 (“The many ‘activist’ rulings of
the Warren Court expanding individual rights and the jurisdiction of federal
courts are the paradigmatic example of courts protecting the rights of minorities. Indeed, in academia and in politics, the Warren Court is still synonymous
with judicial activism.”).
183. See N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 724–25 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(“[O]ur judgments in the present cases may not be taken to indicate the propriety, in the future, of issuing temporary stays and restraining orders to
block the publication of material sought to be suppressed by the Government.”).
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Cases emerging from the Espionage Act of 1917 provide
additional support for this view. According to the Bush administration, the Espionage Act “provides a statutory basis to prosecute both government employees who leak classified information, and journalists and members of the public who pass on or
even willingly receive such information.”184 Nevertheless, at
present, only two prosecutions have been brought under the Act
“outside of a classic espionage or spying context.”185 The
Court’s’ approach to these cases suggests a model for the NSL
controversy.
United States v. Morison considered an Espionage Act conviction.186 The defendant was convicted on four counts, the first
of which involved illegally leaking secured satellite photographs to the press.187 Affirming his conviction, the Fourth Circuit observed that it “[did] not perceive any First Amendment
rights to be implicated here” because the defendant was a government employee who knowingly and willfully broke protocol
in releasing the photographs.188 The First Amendment does not
provide license to violate valid criminal laws, and the mere fact
that a news organization was involved did not bring about special First Amendment protections.189
However, in his concurrence, Circuit Judge Wilkinson suggested that the First Amendment was implicated in this
case.190 He argued that while First Amendment issues are
usually subject to an “aggressive balancing” of the interests involved, issues of national security should bring greater judicial
deference to the “political branches” of government.191 For a
First Amendment claim, he noted, “the Court has held that
government restrictions that would otherwise be impermissible
may be sustained where national security and foreign policy
are implicated.”192 In the interest of separation of powers, the
judiciary needs to recognize the compelling interest in preserv-

184. Kitrosser, supra note 121, at 883.
185. Id. at 882. The cases referenced are Morison and Rosen. Id. The Morison court acknowledged that this was not a case of “classic” spying. See United
States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1070 (4th Cir. 1988).
186. Morison, 844 F.2d at 1060.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1068.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1082.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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ing secrecy in these situations.193 “[A]ggressive balancing,” he
argued, is not required.194
The second relevant Espionage Act prosecution, United
States v. Rosen, involved two pro-Israel lobbyists.195 Responding to their lobbying efforts, the government alleged that the
two defendants built relationships with government officials
who had special access to sensitive government information.
Additionally, the government claimed that the defendants obtained information through those relationships and transmitted it to unauthorized persons, including foreign government
officials.196 As in Morison, the facts implicated matters of national security.197 As a preliminary matter, the court determined that the First Amendment applied.198 Prosecutions under the Espionage Act “unquestionably” merit First
Amendment scrutiny,199 with the crucial caveat that “the rights
protected by the First Amendment must at times yield to the
need for national security.”200 Unfortunately, the Rosen court
does not define those times explicitly.
The Rosen court left no doubt that a government employee
who signed a secrecy agreement and leaked classified information in bad faith does not receive First Amendment protection.201 The more difficult cases involve those who have not vi193. Id.
194. Id. The reference to “[a]ggressive balancing” appears to rule out the
use of the strict scrutiny standard, or at least to provide justification for applying intermediate scrutiny. Id. As one author has noted, “the Supreme Court
has never discussed whether intermediate scrutiny should apply in this context, [but] the Court has indicated that it may be willing to subject secrecy statutes, such as the NSL nondisclosure provisions, to greater regulation. This
leeway should allow a court to apply intermediate scrutiny.” Brett A. Shumate, Comment, Thou Shalt Not Speak: The Nondisclosure Provisions of the
National Security Letter Statutes and the First Amendment Challenge, 41
GONZ. L. REV. 151, 167 (2006) (rejecting the Doe I court’s decision to apply
strict scrutiny on the Butterworth reasoning).
195. See United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 607 (E.D. Va. 2006);
Kitrosser, supra note 121, at 900.
196. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 608.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 630 (“In the broadest terms, the conduct at issue—collecting information about the United States’ foreign policy and discussing that information with government officials (both United States and foreign), journalists,
and other participants in the foreign policy establishment—is at the core of
the First Amendment’s guarantees.”).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 634.
201. Id. at 636.

296

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[93:274

olated any nondisclosure pact with the government202—such as,
perhaps, the Internet company president in Doe III, who never
voluntarily agreed to nondisclosure. These individuals, the Rosen court reasons, merit stronger First Amendment protections.203 Nevertheless, even with heightened protection, Congress still may constitutionally limit disclosure of secret
information in “situations in which national security is genuinely at risk.”204 Both the Rosen defendants and the Doe
plaintiffs should fall within that category. The theme from the
Pentagon Papers dissents and Morison case continues: national
security deserves special consideration in First Amendment
cases. The Doe III court did not appear to give national security
any special consideration in its decision to declare § 2709(c) unconstitutional.
III. COURTS SHOULD APPLY INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
IN FUTURE NSL REVIEWS
Certainly, the Executive may not obtain license to do anything it wishes simply by invoking “national security.” That notion runs entirely contrary to First Amendment principles. As
Judge Wilkinson noted, “[t]he First Amendment interest in informed popular debate does not simply vanish at the invocation
of the words ‘national security.’”205 The Rosen court also stated
that “the mere invocation of ‘national security’ or ‘government
secrecy’ does not foreclose a First Amendment inquiry.”206 At
the same time, the Supreme Court has also observed that “[i]t
is obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is
more compelling than the security of the Nation.”207 This Section seeks to strike a balance among those values and examines
whether secrecy is equally compelling.
A. NSLS SUBSTANTIALLY ADVANCE NATIONAL-SECURITY
INTERESTS AND SECRECY PLAYS AN INTEGRAL ROLE
As discussed above, Congress recognizes the high value of
NSLs and made it easier for the FBI to issue NSLs under the
ECPA.208 The nondisclosure orders preserve secrecy, which, ac202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id.
Id. at 636–37.
Id. at 639.
United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1081 (4th Cir. 1988).
Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 630.
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (citations omitted).
See Sievert, supra note 21, at 338.
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cording to one scholar, advances the “heart of intelligence operations.”209 One might object, however, that NSLs simply do not
analogize to the grand intelligence instruments in, for example,
Pentagon Papers, in which The New York Times sought to publish an historical account of how the U.S. became involved in
the Vietnam War.210 NSLs also are admittedly much smaller in
scope than even the intelligence at issue in Rosen, in which two
lobbyists obtained classified information and shared it with a
foreign government. NSL recipients, by contrast, merely want
to notify their customers that the FBI is watching them. Nevertheless, NSLs’ smaller scale should not detract from their role
in advancing crucial national security issues.
Furthermore, preserving secrecy in NSL investigations
prevents enemies from obtaining compromising information. As
one scholar has pointed out, seemingly small and trivial pieces
of information—such as disclosure of an NSL recipient—can
mean a great deal to espionage experts.211 There is a danger
that foreign powers may “be able to discern from the individual
tiles the larger intelligence mosaic.”212 Large-scale security
leaks are obviously harmful, but even “innocuous disclosures”
can compromise national objectives.213
It is true, as some critics have noted, that needless nondisclosure can actually have a harmful effect.214 Imposing unwarranted nondisclosure orders unfairly reduces public access to
information about NSLs. The Senate appears to recognize this
problem in Senate Bill 2088,215 which requires the FBI to lift
the nondisclosure order when the need for secrecy has elapsed
or expired. The Senate should ensure that this type of safeguard attaches to any future NSL legislation in order to avoid
the dangers of unnecessary gag orders.

209. Sales, supra note 30, at 818 (citing CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 167
(1985)).
210. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714, 717 (1971);
Kitrosser, supra note 121, at 897.
211. Sales, supra note 30, at 819–20.
212. Id. at 820 (citations omitted).
213. Id. at 819.
214. See Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in
Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 136 (2006) (describing
classification as a “double-edged sword” and noting that unnecessary secrets
impose “real costs” that undermine the legitimacy of government (citations
omitted)).
215. See NSL Reform Act of 2007, S. 2088, 110th Cong. (2007).
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There is no serious doubt that NSLs advance nationalsecurity interests, and that NSL secrecy is necessary in most
cases. A single disclosure of an NSL may appear small-scale yet
have much broader ripple effects, and so NSLs should be
treated as any other serious national-security device and given
the same type of judicial review.
B. DEVISING THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. The Justification for Strict Scrutiny is Unpersuasive
The Doe III court justifies its application of strict scrutiny
based on the Rhinehart-Butterworth-Freedman line of cases,
but its reasoning appears unsatisfying given the subject matter. The Doe III court summarizes First Amendment principles
as follows: any nondisclosure order “on information acquired by
way of a confidential government investigation” will likely satisfy strict scrutiny based on two key factors.216 Those are “the
compelling government interest in keeping ongoing investigations secret, and the safeguard that the restraint is necessarily
narrowly tailored to curtail the minimum of speech.”217 The sufficiency of those safeguards, the court notes, may be tested via
Freedman.218
Section 2709(c) provides that if the FBI Director (or other
approved official) “certifies that otherwise there may result a
danger to the national security of the United States” or other
harm, “no wire or electronic communication service provider, or
officer, employee, or agent thereof, shall disclose to any person . . . that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or
obtained access to information or records under this section.”219
This language grants the FBI, the Doe III court notes, “broad
discretion” on a case-by-case basis “to grant some NSL recipients permission to disclose certain information pertaining to
their receipt of an NSL and to deny others that freedom.”220
The court’s primary objection is that the FBI has unfettered
authority to decide who may and may not speak.221 This power
216. Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2709(c) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008).
220. Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 400.
221. Id. (“[T]he FBI, based on its own case-by-case assessment, now has
broad discretion to grant some NSL recipients permission to disclose certain
information pertaining to their receipt of an NSL and to deny others that freedom.”).
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appears analogous to that of the censorship board in Freedman,
which had broad authority to approve or deny films for contentbased reasons according to its own discretion.222 The Doe III
court therefore mandated the application of the Freedman safeguards.223 Under the Reauthorization Act, the government
does not bear the burden of going to court to enforce the nondisclosure order.224 Plainly, § 3511(b) achieves the opposite effect by requiring the NSL recipient to take his challenge to
court.225 Finding this burden at least as onerous as that of the
plaintiffs in Freedman, the Doe III court ruled that § 3511(b)
fails Freedman requirements, and is therefore unconstitutional.226
However, this interpretation of Freedman fails to account
for the vastly different subject matter at issue in NSL challenges.227 NSL nondisclosure orders do not analogize to film
censorship: the latter relates to the appropriateness of entertainment, while the former concerns saving American lives and
prosecuting terrorists. In the same way, NSLs are distinguishable from the secrecy required in grand jury proceedings for
common crimes (as per Butterworth).228 NSLs have played a
key role in fighting international terrorism; grand jury secrecy
does not promote goals of such magnitude. The Supreme Court
has declared that the Constitution “is not a suicide pact.”229
When national security is at stake, film screenings do not merit
the same treatment as NSLs.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court indicated that strict
scrutiny applies if the government has imposed speech restric222. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 52 (1965).
223. Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 401.
224. Id.
225. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3511(b) (West 2006); see also Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at
401.
226. Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 406.
227. See generally JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL
SECURITY LAW FOR PERILOUS TIMES 13 (2007) (arguing that national security
issues invoke different legal concerns). The article notes that invoking national security “has obvious ramifications in a constitutional climate where presidents have long asserted authority to use force as commander in chief, without
express congressional authorization, and to employ instruments of intelligence
without legislative or judicial review.” Id.
228. See Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 626 (1990) (“We hold that insofar as the Florida law prohibits a grand jury witness from disclosing his own
testimony after the term of the grand jury has ended, it violates the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution.”).
229. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).
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tions for agreeing or disagreeing with a particular message or
viewpoint.230 The Supreme Court declared as much in R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul.231 The important distinction in NSL nondisclosure cases is that the government does not object to the message that NSLs are a bad thing; the OIG Report and Washington Post editorial demonstrate the government’s acceptance of
an anti-NSL view.232 This is not a case in which the government allows pro-NSL speech but suppresses dissent. An ISP
who publicly applauds an NSL he received violates the law as
much as another ISP who decries it. This situation appears to
fall outside the primary purpose of strict scrutiny, making its
application here further suspect.
2. Intermediate Scrutiny Offers a Better Solution
One means of arguing that the Doe III court erred is to
suggest that under the Butterworth-Kamasinski reasoning, the
nondisclosure order in § 2709(c) is in reality neither a prior restraint on speech nor a content-based restriction, but is instead
a content-neutral order. Therefore, intermediate scrutiny applies. The government argued accordingly in its brief to the
court,233 and NSL scholars have taken a similar approach.234
Because that argument has failed twice—in Doe I and III—
future courts need a novel approach to justify intermediate
scrutiny. In other words, even if NSL nondisclosure is a prior
restraint or content-based restriction, it still merits only inter230. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994)
(noting the reasons for strict scrutiny review).
231. 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“The First Amendment generally prevents
government from proscribing speech . . . because of disapproval of the ideas
expressed.” (citations omitted)).
232. See OIG REPORT, supra note 28; Editorial, supra note 2.
233. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of the Government's Cross-Motion to Dismiss
the Complaint Or For Summary Judgment, Doe I, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. 04 Civ. 2614), vacated, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006)
(“First, § 2709(c) does not impose a ‘prior restraint’ on speech” because the statute “does not create any licensing system . . . . Second, § 2709(c) is not the
type of ‘content-based’ restriction that requires traditional strict scrutiny . . .
.”).
234. See, e.g., Shumate, supra note 194, 166–67 (“[T]he Doe [I] court incorrectly selected and applied strict scrutiny in its analysis of the nondisclosure
provision . . . .”). That Comment appeared prior to the Doe III decision and the
passage of the Reauthorization Act and did not argue for intermediate scrutiny on national security grounds. Because the Doe I and Doe III courts have
rejected this line of reasoning, this Note now propounds an alternative justification for intermediate scrutiny.
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mediate scrutiny because important national security issues
are at stake.
Intermediate scrutiny avoids the practical inconsistency
that the Rosen court noted in its analysis of Pentagon Papers.235
The Rosen court drew a distinction between imposing a prior
restraint on speech and punishing illegally leaked speech.236
The Supreme Court usually applies a “heavy presumption” that
prior restraints on speech are unconstitutional.237 As the Rosen
court suggests, however, the government might have prevailed
in Pentagon Papers if it had prosecuted the newspapers via the
Espionage Act post-publication rather than seeking an injunction pre-publication. The majority of the opinions in Pentagon
Papers reflect a general abhorrence for prior restraints on
speech.238 Yet later federal courts have willingly prosecuted individuals for espionage after they have already leaked information.239 Strict scrutiny, as seen in Doe, invalidated a so-called
prior restraint on speech when that speech might be illegal anyway under the Espionage Act.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the First
Amendment does not bar prosecution for treasonous speech.240
But it is inconsistent to refuse to restrain speech only to prosecute the speaker once the words are said. A better solution
would be to accept that certain information may or may not be
released. If disclosure of particular materials would subject the
leak to a valid criminal prosecution, then there is no reason for
a court to deny issuing a preliminary injunction simply to preserve strict scrutiny review of prior restraints. The intermediate scrutiny requirements, as discussed below, allow nondisclosure orders to pass constitutional muster, thereby avoiding
the problem of allowing speech to occur yet prosecuting it subsequent to its occurrence.

235. United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 638 (E.D. Va. 2006).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 701, 714–15 (1971)
(Black, J., concurring) (“I believe that every moment's continuance of the injunctions against these newspapers amounts to a flagrant, indefensible, and
continuing violation of the First Amendment.”).
239. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992).
240. See, e.g., id. at 389 (“[W]ords can in some circumstances violate laws
directed not against speech but against conduct (a law against treason, for example, is violated by telling the enemy the Nation's defense secrets). . . .”).
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3. Because of the Subject Matter, Case Law Supports
Intermediate Scrutiny241
The Doe III decision, in its application of strict scrutiny,
overlooks the vast body of case law indicating that issues of national security deserve different treatment. Those cases, such
as Morison, promote the importance of deference to the Executive without explicitly advocating intermediate scrutiny.242 A
major objection, then, to the use of intermediate scrutiny is
that there are no major First Amendment cases of prior restraint and content-based restrictions in which a majority of
the Court held that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate.243
One possible response to this objection is that courts have focused on achieving specific outcomes in individual cases rather
than developing a coherent long-term jurisprudence. Therefore,
if a court applies strict scrutiny but automatically gives the appropriate deference to an executive foreign policy decision, the
result is no different from applying intermediate scrutiny.244
When courts deciding national security cases grant substantial
leeway to an executive determination as the Pentagon Papers
concurrences and dissents suggest they should, they are in fact
applying intermediate scrutiny review.
Furthermore, true strict scrutiny calls for a level of inquiry
that might force the executive branch to disclose information
that should be kept secret. Secrecy is necessary to protect “the
Executive’s intelligence sources and methods, or information
about the manner in which the government collects intelligence.”245 Compromising those sources “can have devastating
consequences” such as allowing enemies to evade detection,
hindering strikes on foreign powers, and even opening the nation to “assaults against American interests.”246 Justice Har241. As noted earlier, other authors have made the argument that the very
framework on which Doe III is built (such as Butterworth) already provides
case law justification for intermediate scrutiny. This Section takes a different
approach by examining national security cases instead. See supra note 234
and accompanying text.
242. See, e.g., United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1082 (1988).
243. See BAKER, supra note 227, at 16 (“Judicial treatments of ‘national
security’ also vary, in part, because courts tend to be guided by the specific
case or controversy presented rather than a desire to find central and lasting
constitutional constructions.”).
244. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (purporting to
apply strict scrutiny while deferring to President Roosevelt’s foreign policy decision).
245. Sales, supra note 30, at 818.
246. Id.
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lan’s Pentagon Papers dissent indicated a limited role for the
judiciary in this type of situation. As described above, NSLs fall
within the ambit of the Executive’s “foreign power,” and their
disclosure could “irreparably impair the national security.”247
When courts delve into these matters, the proper review standard should be as limited as intermediate scrutiny allows.248
Some observers rightfully counter that disclosure of classified information constitutes “very high value speech” because
speech concerning government activities “is at the core of the
First Amendment’s value.”249 Since the government-related
speech is the First Amendment’s focus, this argument goes,
courts must “strongly protect classified information dissemination by the press and public.”250 Free speech is weakened,
moreover, if nondisclosure prevents the public from learning
more information about NSLs.251 The current First Amendment
provisions in the NSL—which require FBI certification that the
NSL is not conducted on the basis of First Amendment activities—do not sufficiently protect First Amendment rights,252 and
only strict scrutiny provides a real check on the Executive’s
power and prevents abuse.253
However, in the context of NSLs, these arguments are not
persuasive. NSL disclosures are distinguishable from the type
of disclosure at issue in Pentagon Papers. In that case, The New
York Times, at the height of the Vietnam War, sought to pub247. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 701, 757 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
248. Kitrosser, supra note 121, at 909 (noting that the judiciary already
closely scrutinizes national security rationales for speech suppression). But see
BAKER, supra note 227, at 27 (“[T]he inclusion of the legislative or judicial
branches [does not] necessarily undermine the national security requirements
for speed and secrecy. . . . [T]he government’s most sensitive secrets can be
subject to external judicial validation without disclosure.”).
249. Kitrosser, supra note 121, at 906.
250. Id. at 923.
251. See Fuchs, supra note 214, at 141 (“Freedom of speech and the right to
petition the government for redress of grievances are weak rights if government officials withhold information necessary to a complete understanding of
the issue in controversy.”).
252. See Solove, supra note 60, at 168.
253. See Susan M. Herman, The USA Patriot Act and the Submajoritarian
Fourth Amendment, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 67, 129 (2006) (arguing that
because a simple balancing test “between liberty and security” tends to “stack
the deck against claims of individual rights,” the government’s burden should
not be reduced); see also BAKER, supra note 227, at 22 (noting that because
matters of security are concrete and the preservation of “liberty” is abstract,
policymakers tend to favor bolstering security).

304

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[93:274

lish secret documents that revealed how the United States became involved in the war.254 For the public, the documents constituted new information that shed light on the substantive decision making at the highest levels of government; it was the
type of information that an informed citizenry would want to
know. NSL disclosures are a different matter because they do
not reveal any new information about the government’s activities. Thanks to the recent and comprehensive OIG Report,
which is freely available over the Internet, the general public
already has ample information about the existence and use of
NSLs. Thus, if the company president of Doe III were to disclose that he had received an NSL, he would not be providing
any new information to the national debate except that his own
particular customers may be under surveillance, which would
defeat the NSL’s purpose.
In any case, the company president was not prohibited
from sharing his views on NSLs; the government did not prosecute him for his Washington Post editorial. Even in the national
forum, he was free to express the NSL’s impact on his life and
why he felt it was inappropriate. The catch is that he had to do
so anonymously, which only further indicates that the government supports public debate on NSLs so long as its specific individual targets are not alerted that they are under surveillance.
There are two serious reasons to allow the company president to reveal his name. First, personifying an NSL request allows the public to place a human face and name on the NSL regime. The public may not care about anonymous, ethereal NSL
recipients, but if the public knew that the popular and respected John Doe had received an NSL request, it might feel differently about the value of NSLs. This argument has some
weight, but it is ultimately less compelling than the strong
needs for secrecy. The public already has information that telecommunications providers generally are subject to NSL requests, and that the FBI issued over 47,000 such requests in
2005.255 Furthermore, the public need not dig up obscure publications like the OIG Report; even The Washington Post in 2005
reported on widespread NSL usage.256 The most significant in254. See supra notes 159–63163 and accompanying text.
255. See OIG REPORT, supra note 28, at 36.
256. See Barton Gellman, The FBI's Secret Scrutiny: In Hunt for Terrorists,
Bureau Examines Records of Ordinary Americans, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2005,
at A1; see also Herman, supra note 253, at 87 (“The public learned from a 2005
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formation about NSLs is already publicly available, and whatever value personification adds should not trump the government’s undisputed need for secrecy.
The second reason not to allow the company president to
reveal his name is that if the company president were allowed
to speak openly about his NSL request, his customers would
know that they are being watched, and they could temper their
activities accordingly or, alternatively, decide to play a role in
the national debate on NSLs. But notifying these individuals—
law-abiding or otherwise—that they are being watched may defeat the purpose of the NSL regime. NSL secrecy preserves ongoing investigations. One expert notes that “[i]f a target discovers he is under surveillance, he might flee or go into hiding.”257
The company president’s sense of personal duty to clients cannot trump the government’s legitimate and necessary investigative methods that preserve national security.
Civil libertarians may also object to the use of intermediate
scrutiny because it can lead to increased FBI investigation into
private activity. The targets, this argument goes, deserve higher protection, and strict scrutiny will improve the chances of an
ISP warning its customers that they are being watched.258 Furthermore, limiting some rights sends the nation down a slippery slope in which more and more important liberties are
threatened.259 This argument fails to note, however, that the
targets have already willingly given the information the government seeks—URLs, e-mail addresses, phone records, and
the like—to the ISP, a third party. When Internet users type a
URL into a browser, they do so knowing that their ISP can
track that address the same way that a postal carrier can see
the destination addresses of outgoing letters he or she picks up.
NSLs do not let the FBI into specific e-mails to read their content, but they do allow the FBI to see an e-mail’s recipient,
Washington Post article, rather than a government report or court order, that
the FBI has issued more than 30,000 National Security Letters a year, an astronomical increase over ‘historic norms.’”).
257. Sales, supra note 30, at 821.
258. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 60, at 167–68 (“The blogger’s political expression may be substantially chilled by the government’s actions. . . . Given
the blogger’s radical and unpopular beliefs, she might be speaking anonymously precisely in order to shield her identity from the government.”).
259. But see AMITAI ETZIONI, HOW PATRIOTIC IS THE PATRIOT ACT?: FREEDOM VERSUS SECURITY IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM 39 (2004) (“It is true that
almost any of the new security measures may threaten our rights if used wantonly yet they could also be quite acceptable if used under very limited conditions, under the supervision of the courts, [and] Congress . . . .”).
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which is information the target has already relinquished. Intermediate scrutiny will not let the FBI read through American
citizens’ personal e-mails to friends and colleagues,260 but it
will better allow the FBI to perform its crucial antiterrorism
activities more effectively by ensuring secrecy.
Thus, NSL disclosures have some worth, but not value on
par with other notable information leaks that scholars argue
merit the highest First Amendment protection. While speech
about government activities may lie at the heart of the First
Amendment’s protection, the need to keep NSLs secret is more
compelling in this case.
C. JUDGING NSL REQUESTS UNDER A LOWER STANDARD
This Section has suggested that intermediate scrutiny is
appropriate for NSL review, and Doe III already has illustrated
how strict scrutiny application would invalidate at least some
NSL provisions. Per intermediate scrutiny review, a statute
“will be sustained under the First Amendment if it advances
important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression
of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech
than necessary to further those interests.”261 This Section analyzes competing interests to determine how reviewing courts
should balance the competing values in an NSL dispute.
National security is an “important government interest,”
but is secrecy? Professor Nathan Alexander Sales has outlined
the government’s specific interests in secrecy.262 First, secrecy
protects the executive’s sources as well as the process by which
the government acquires information.263 In this area, secrecy
protects identities of covert operatives.264 Compromising those
sources and methods may produce “devastating conse-

260. See RONALD J. SIEVERT, DEFENSE, LIBERTY, AND THE CONSTITUTION:
EXPLORING THE CRITICAL NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES OF OUR TIME 81 (2005)
(noting that claims that the Patriot Act allows the government to read through
e-mails without a warrant are “inaccurate and misleading”).
261. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997). But see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Medium Rare Scrutiny, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 397, 397–
98 (1998) (arguing that the various levels of scrutiny are defined imprecisely
and applied inconsistently, and noting at least four different kinds of “intermediate scrutiny”). The government advocates the Turner Broadcasting definition of intermediate scrutiny in its Doe I brief.
262. See Sales, supra note 30, at 818.
263. Id.
264. Id.
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quences.”265 Second, secrecy prevents “diplomatic embarrassment”—the strained relationship that results when one country
learns that another has spied on it.266 Diplomatic embarrassment also results when an entity is exposed for cooperating
with the U.S.267 Third, and perhaps the most compelling interest, secrecy preserves ongoing investigations.268 If a target
learns he is being watched, he may destroy evidence or alert
others in ways that jeopardize the investigation and prosecution.269 He may fabricate evidence “to throw investigators off
his trail.”270 Even Congress has acknowledged the compelling
need for secrecy, and it recognized as much when it passed the
§ 2709 nondisclosure provision.271
These interests, of course, must be balanced against the Internet provider’s interests in disclosure.272 Professor Sales argues that the strength of an Internet provider’s speech interest
hinges on the information’s origin.273 As Justice Scalia noted in
Butterworth,274 a provider has a stronger interest in speech
about information he possessed prior to any interaction with
the government.275 The provider’s interests are weaker, however, when the provider wishes to disclose information obtained
only through contact with the FBI.276 In the Doe cases, the information that Internet providers wish to reveal falls into this
second category because, but for the NSL request, the provider
would not know of the FBI’s actions. This suggests a reduced
speech interest, according to Professor Sales.277
265. Id. at 820.
266. Id. (“America suffered severe embarrassment, and a summit between
Khrushchev and Eisenhower was ruined, after a Soviet surface to air missile
downed [a U.S.] spyplane over Sverdlovsk in 1960.”).
267. See id.
268. See id. (“If a target discovers he is under surveillance, he might flee or
go into hiding.”).
269. See id.
270. Id.
271. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, at 228 (1978), as reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9359 (“[The nondisclosure provision] assure[s] the absolute
secrecy needed for the investigations covered by the exemptions.”).
272. See Sales, supra note 30, at 827 (“Secrecy requirements profoundly
affect the speech interests of third parties who wish to publicly discuss their
experiences.”).
273. See id. at 828.
274. See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text.
275. See Sales, supra note 30, at 828.
276. See id. at 828–29.
277. See id.
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Of course, the broader public may also have an interest in
disclosure.278 One part of that interest is government accountability; the FBI may act differently if it knows that its actions
are open to public scrutiny.279 On the other hand, secrecy can
also serve the larger public interest—if, for example, the government suppresses information that could endanger American
lives if revealed.280
Despite these objections to nondisclosure, the above governmental interests constitute an important interest unrelated to the suppression of free speech. The next question, then,
is whether the nondisclosure order substantially burdens more
speech than necessary to further those interests. NSL nondisclosure orders impose almost a complete ban on speech—
almost, because, as the Internet company president has shown,
an NSL recipient still has the ability to speak anonymously
about receiving the NSL. The recipient cannot identify himself,
however, and for good reason: even publicly identifying himself
as an NSL recipient could alert his customers—who may be
FBI targets—that they are being watched. This burden on
speech is exactly what is necessary to preserve the investigative
value of NSLs. In any case, courts are not in a good position to
judge what level of speech burden is appropriate in NSL cases,
and therefore they must give substantial deference to executive
determinations.281 In this case, the FBI has determined via certification that secrecy is necessary,282 and the current nondis278. See id. at 816 (“‘Democracies die behind closed doors,’ and ‘[s]unlight
is said to be the best of disinfectants.’” (citations omitted)).
279. See id. at 829–30 (“Government officials are less likely to misbehave if
they know their actions are a matter of public record.”).
280. Id. at 830.
281. Compare CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985) (“Thus, ‘[w]hat may
seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has a
broad view of the scene and may put the questioned item of information in its
proper context.’” (quoting Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1978))),
and Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 927 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (“Given this weight of authority counseling deference in national
security matters, we owe deference to the government's judgments contained
in its affidavits.”), and King v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 217 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (“[T]he court owes substantial weight to detailed agency explanations in the national security context.”), with Robert P. Deyling, Judicial Deference and De Novo Review in Litigation Over National Security Information
Under the Freedom of Information Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 67, 90 (1992) (“Judges
dealing with these cases face a dilemma. Despite judicial deference to agency
judgments, judges must continue to review [secrecy] cases and try to make
that review thorough and meaningful.”).
282. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2709(b) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008). The proposed
Senate bill requires the same certification. See NSL Reform Act of 2007, S.
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closure requirement bans only the speech necessary to advance
the government’s interest.
Critics might suggest that the government’s interest in
secrecy appears too vague or undefined in the NSL context.
However, such imprecision is inevitable because intelligence
operations are by nature shrouded in secrecy.283 Under the intermediate scrutiny standard, the government can show a sufficiently strong interest supporting NSL nondisclosure, as well
as appropriate tailoring given the needs of secrecy. This outcome is different from that reached in Doe III and better reflects the importance of protecting key investigative techniques.
CONCLUSION
The company president of The Washington Post editorial
has been successful so far, both in Doe I and III. His first challenge brought about a change in NSL policy codified in the
Reauthorization Act. The second challenge has produced a new
bill in the Senate. To be sure, the Doe courts noted several constitutional defects in the NSL regime; it is possible that even
under intermediate scrutiny, various NSL statutes would fail.
For example, NSL recipients must have easy access to speedy
judicial review, which the post-Patriot Act NSL statutes did not
provide. Such statutes were rightly declared unconstitutional.
Indeed, this Note has readily adopted the position that judicial
review is necessary,284 and asked how the review should occur
when a dispute arises. Courts should give great deference to
executive decisions, particularly in cases in which the executive
has determined that secrecy is necessary. This Note also argues
that strict scrutiny is inappropriate, and that this remains true
regardless of whether Congress passes Senate Bill 2088.
The need for nondisclosure and preserving secrecy should
not be understated. U.S. history presents countless examples of
2088, 110th Cong. (2007).
283. The U.S. Supreme Court noted as much in United States v. United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. See 407 U.S. 297,
322 (1972) (“Often, too, the emphasis of domestic intelligence gathering is on
the prevention of unlawful activity or the enhancement of the Government's
preparedness for some possible future crisis or emergency. Thus, the focus of
domestic surveillance may be less precise than that directed against more conventional types of crime.”).
284. This is justified because the latest Senate bill provides for prompt
judicial review. See NSL Reform Act of 2007, S. 2088, 110th Cong. (2007); see
also Deyling, supra note 281, at 90 (“[I]f courts cannot have full latitude to
conduct that review, then no one can.”).
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secrecy breaches and the disasters that followed. In 1942, for
example, the Chicago Tribune reported that American forces
had cracked a key Japanese naval code that had contributed to
victory in the Battle of Midway.285 The newspaper’s disclosure
prompted the Japanese to switch to a new, unbroken code.286
The double agent Aldrich Ames’s disclosures to the U.S.S.R. resulted in the executions of at least ten American agents.287
Even more troubling is a case involving the hunt for Osama bin
Laden. After the 1998 U.S. missile strikes on Afghanistan, “a
newspaper revealed that American investigators were aware
that al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden used a satellite telephone to communicate with his associates. . . .”288 After the
newspaper report, “bin Laden abruptly stopped using the phone
and investigators lost the ability to eavesdrop on his conversations.”289
The list of harms goes on, and the takeaway should be apparent: secrecy is highly valuable, and the Executive, as numerous courts have acknowledged, is in the best position to determine when secrecy is appropriate. In reviewing NSL
statutes, intermediate scrutiny appropriately balances national
interests against individual rights. Since “the energy of the Executive is the bulwark of the national security,”290 courts should
defer accordingly.

285. Sales, supra note 30, at 818–19.
286. Id. at 819.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 834.
289. Id.
290. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 395 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961.

